

Component Group:

Propellant Valves

CIL Item:

D500-04

Component:

**GOX Control Valve** 

Part Number:

R8010141

Fallure Mode:

Valve falls to open.

Prepared:

P. Lowrimore T. Nguyen 5/30/99

Approved:
Approval Date:
Change #:
Directive #;

CCBD ME3-01-5226

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Phase	Failure / Effect Description	Criticality Hazard Reference			
\$ 4.1	Loss of page suppression capability; controller page GOX flow check results in MCF and vehicle commanded shuldown. Mission scrub Loss of vehicle due to page may result if GCV failure is not detected.				
	Redundancy Screens: VALVE SYSTEM - SENSOR SYSTEM: UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.	ME-G8M			
	A: Pass - Redundant hardware items are capable of checkout during normal ground turnaround.  B. Pass - Loss of a redundant hardware items is detectable during flight.  C: Pass - Loss of redundant hardware items could not result from a single credible event.				

## SSME FMEA/CIL DESIGN

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### Design / Document Reference

### FAILURE CAUSE: A: Piston seizure or binding.

THE LOCATION OF THE PISTON (1) IN THE HOUSING (2) BORE IS DETERMINED BY THE POPPET STEM (3). THE POPPET STEM GUIDES ON THE HOUSING THROUGH THE GUIDE (3) ON THE POPPET END AND ON THE PISTON SEAL (4) ON THE PISTON END. THE PISTON (1) TO HOUSING CLEARANCE MINIMIZES THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO PARTS. THE PISTON AND HOUSING ARE HEAT TREATED INCONEL 718 WHICH WAS SELECTED FOR ITS STRENGTH, HARDNESS, AND WEAR RESISTANCE (5). THE PISTON SEAL IS GRAPHITE-FILLED POLYIMIDE. THE MATERIAL WAS SELECTED FOR ITS LOW COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION, STRENGTH, AND RIGIDITY.

(1) RS010149; (2) RS010142; (3) RS010146, RS010148; (4) RES1241, (5) RSS-8582

FAILURE CAUSE: B: Damaged guide assembly.

C: Piston or guide housing galled.

THE POPPET STEM GUIDE (1) MATERIAL IS A COPPER-NICKEL ZINC ALLOY. THE MATERIAL WAS SELECTED FOR ITS LOW COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION AND ITS STRENGTH (2). THE QUIDE FRICTION IS FURTHER REDUCED BY A COATING OF DRY-FILM LUBRICANT (t). THE QUIDE OPERATES IN A BORE OF THE HOUSING, THE HOUSING (3) MATERIAL IS HEAT. TREATED INCONEL 718. THE MATERIAL WAS SELECTED FOR ITS STRENGTH AND HARDNESS (2). BOTH MATERIALS ARE CORROSION AND STRESS-CORROSION RESISTANT (2). THE PISTON (4) IS GUIDED BY A SPRING-LOADED GRAPHITE-FILLED POLYIMIDE SEAL. THE SEAL MATERIAL WAS CHOSEN FOR ITS LOW COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION, STRENGTH AND RIGIDITY. THE CLEARANCE BETWEEN THE PISTON AND HOUSING PREVENTS CONTACT AND GALLING BETWEEN THE HOUSING (3) AND PISTON. THE DESIGN ALSO INCORPORATES FEATURES WHICH MINIMIZE THE POTENTIAL OF GUIDE, PISTON, OR HOUSING DAMAGE. THE FLOW IMPINGES ON THE FACE OF THE POPPET WHICH MINIMIZES THE SIDE LOADS. THE POPPET OVERHANG ALSO MINIMIZES THE SIDE LOAD. THE LARGE PISTON STEM 1/0 PREVENTS DAMAGE CAUSED BY COCKING, THE SHORT STROKE MINIMIZES WEAR AND MINIMIZES THE POTENTIAL OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY CONTAMINATION.

(1) RS010148; (2) RS5-8582; (3) RS010142; (4) RS010149

FAILURE CAUSE: ALL CAUSES

POGO GOX PRESSURE CHECK WILL DETECT FAILURE TO OPEN AND WILL INITIATE LAUNCH SCRUB AND PREVENT FAILURE RESULTING IN CRITICAL 1 EFFECTS (1). THE GOX CONTROL VALVE HAS COMPLETED THE DVS TEST REQUIREMENTS (2) INCLUDING VIBRATION (3), AND ENDURANCE (4).

(1) CP406R0002 PT 1 3.2.3:6.4; (2) DVS-SSME-517; (3) RSS-517-40, RSS-517-50; (4) RSS-517-50

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# SSME FM<sup>r</sup> CIL INSPECTION A...D TEST

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**GDX Control Valve** 

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Fallure Causes	Significant Characteristics	Inspection(s) / Test(s)	Document Reference
A, B. C	PISTON HOUSING STEM GUIDE SEAL		RS010149 RS010142 RS010145 RS010148 RES1241
	MATERIAL INTEGRITY	MATERIAL INTEGRITY IS VERIFIED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS.	
		HEAT TREAT IS VERIFIED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS.	R\$010149 R\$010142 R\$010145
		DRY-FILM LUBRICANT IS VERIFIED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENT.	RS010148
		PISTON, POPPET STEM, AND GUIDE DIAMETERS ARE VERIFIED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS.	RS010149 RS010145 RS010148
LL CAUSES	ASSEMBLY INTEGRITY	ASSEMBLY AND FUNCTIONAL TESTING VERIFY PROPER VALVE OPERATION.	 RL00490
	HOT-FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING (GREEN RUN)	VALVE OPERATION IS VERIFIED THROUGH HOT-FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING	RL00461

Failure History:

Comprehensive failure history data is maintained in the Problem Reporting database (PRAMS/PRACA)



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		Weld Number	r Weld Type	Class	Rool Side Not	Critical Initial Flew Size Not Detectable	Correments
Component	Basic Part Number				Access	HCF LCF	
GOX CONTROL VALVE	RS010141	1	EBW	ıi .	Х	<u>x</u>	
GOX CONTROL VALVE	RS010141	2	EBW	II	x		
GOX CONTROL VALVE	RS010141	3,4	EB₩	<b>I1</b>	x	X	
BELLOWS	RS010143	3,4	GTAW	II	х		
BELLOWS	RS010143	5,6	EBW	Ji	x	x	